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Malthusian economies are generally deemed ine¢ cient: stagnated, highly unequal,
and densely populated by a labouring class prone to high fertility. This article denes
and characterizes e¢ cient allocations in Malthusian environments of xed resources
and endogenous fertility. We show, that under general conditions, e¢ cient allocations
exhibit stagnation in standards of living, inequality, di¤erential fertility, and a high
population density of poorer individuals.
Keywords: E¢ ciency, endogenous fertility, stochastic abilities.
JEL Classication: D04, D10, D63, D64, D80, D91, E10, E60, I30, J13, N00,
011, 040, Q01.
I. Introduction
Our understanding of the preindustrial era, as well as the issue of underde-
velopment, is strongly inuenced by Malthusideas. Reacting to the idealistic
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writings of Thomas Godwin on the perfectibility of man, Malthus formulated a
pessimistic view of the world where widespread poverty is an unavoidable conse-
quence of a fundamental law of nature: the passion between the sexes. Malthus
convincingly argued that any abundance of resources ultimately resolves into a
larger but not richer population.1 While Malthus himself advocated for moral
constraints and the dismantling of existing Poor Laws in England as ways to mit-
igate the problem, his ideas naturally lead to other sometimes radical solutions:
the birth control movement of the 1800s, eugenics and Social Darwinism in the
late 1800s and early 1900s, modern family planning policies and the one-child
policy among many others. Family planning remains central to development
e¤orts of institutions such as the World Bank or the Gates Foundation.
Malthusian models have recently gained renewing interest as part of a litera-
ture that seeks to provide a unied theory of economic growth, from prehistoric
to modern times (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990, Jones 1999, Galor and
Weil 2000, Lucas 2002, Hansen and Prescott 2002, and Doepke 2004 are just
some few examples). The focus of this literature has been mostly positive rather
than normative: to describe mechanisms for the stagnation of living standards
even in the presence of technological progress. But the fundamental issue of
e¢ ciency in Malthusian economies, which is key to formulating policy recom-
mendations and better understand the extent to which the "Malthusian trap"
could have been avoided, has received scarce attention.
This article denes and characterizes e¢ cient allocations in Malthusian economies
using modern tools of welfare economics. The focus is solely on the Malthusian
era, before the onset of modern economic growth. This is not a standard ex-
ercise. Although welfare and e¢ ciency properties of models with exogenous
population, such as the Neoclassical Growth model, are well understood, wel-
1. Ashraf and Galor (2011) recently provide evidence supporting the validity of Malthus
predictions for a number of pre-industrial economies.
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fare and e¢ ciency properties of models with endogenous population, such as
the Malthus model, remains largely unexplored, with some few exceptions as we
discuss below.
Our model economy is populated by a large number of nitely-lived fully
rational individuals who are altruistic toward their descendants. Individuals are
of di¤erent types and a type determines characteristics such as labor skills, the
rate of time preference, and ability to raise children. Types are stochastic and
determined at birth. We formulate the problem faced by a benevolent social
planner who cares about the welfare of all potential individuals, present and
future. The planner directly allocates consumption and children to individuals
in all generations and states subject to aggregate resource constraints, promise
keeping constraints, population dynamics and a xed amount of land. The
economy is closed, there is no capital accumulation nor migration. Furthermore,
there are no underlying frictions such as private information or moral hazard so
that the focus is on rst-best allocations.
We consider the extent to which e¢ cient allocations can rationalize three
key aspects of Malthusian economies: (i) stagnation of individual consumption
in the presence of technological progress and/or improvements in the availability
of land; (2) social classes, inequality, and widespread poverty; (3) di¤erential fer-
tilities. The core of the paper focuses on steady state, or stationary, allocations
while issues of stability are left for the Appendix.
The following are the main ndings. First, we show that stagnation is ef-
cient. Specically, steady-state consumption is independent of the amount of
land, and under general conditions, the level of technology. As a result, land dis-
coveries, as the ones discussed by Malthus, lead to more steady-state population
but no additional consumption. An identical prediction holds true for techno-
logical advancements as long as the production technology is Cobb-Douglas or
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technological progress is land-augmenting, the type of progress that is more
needed because land is the limiting factor.
The source of the stagnation is a well-known prediction of endogenous fer-
tility models, according to which optimal consumption is proportional to the
net costs of raising a child. For example, Becker and Barro nd that "when
people are more costly to produce, it is optimal to endow each person produced
with a higher level of consumption. In e¤ect, it pays to raise the utilization
rate(in the sense of a higher c) when costs of production of descendants are
greater (Becker and Barro, 1988, pg. 10)." We show that this link between
optimal consumption and the net cost of raising children also holds true for a
benevolent planner and under more general conditions. The crux of the proof
of stagnation is to show that neither land discoveries nor technological progress
alter the steady-state net cost of raising a child, and in particular, the marginal
product of labor, which is required to value both the parental time costs of
children and childrens marginal output.
Second, we show that e¢ cient allocations exhibit social classes. Only types
with the highest rate of time preference have positive population shares and
consumption in steady state. Furthermore, and unlike the exogenous fertility
case, it is generally not e¢ cient to equalize consumption among types, even if
their Pareto weights are identical, nor to eliminate consumption risk. E¢ cient
consumption is stochastic even in the absence of aggregate risk. These results
are further implications of consumption being a function of the net cost of raising
children. Poor individuals in an e¢ cient allocation are the ones with the lowest
net costs of raising children.
Third, there is an inverse relationship between consumption and population
size: the lower the consumption of a type the larger its share in the population.
As a result, there are more poor individuals than rich individuals in any e¢ cient
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allocation. Furthermore, population inequality is larger than consumption in-
equality by a factor that depends positively on the elasticity of parental altruism
to the number of children and negatively on the intergenerational elasticity of
substitution.2
Fourth, fertility di¤ers among types. Optimal fertility depends on parental
types but also on grandparent types. Given grandparent types, parents with low
consumption have more children than parents with high consumption. More-
over, given parent types, consumption rich grandparents have more grandchil-
dren than consumption poor grandparents.
Fifth, steady state allocations, and in particular the land-labor ratio, gen-
erally depends on initial conditions. The e¢ cient steady state depends on the
initial distribution of population and on Pareto weights. This is unlike the
neoclassical growth model in which the e¢ cient capital-labor ratio, or modi-
ed golden rule level of capital, is independent of initial conditions and Pareto
weights. Malthusian economies thus do not exhibit a clear separation between
e¢ ciency and distribution.
Our results help explain why the so-called Malthusian trap was so perva-
sive in pre-industrial societies. We show that even in the best case scenario
of an economy populated by loving rational parents, and governed by an all
powerful benevolent rational planner, stagnation would still naturally arise, as
well as social classes and di¤erential fertility. Our results also show that is not
the irrational animal spirit of human beings, as suggested by Malthus, what
ultimately explains the stagnation. Stagnation can be the result of an optimal
choice between the quality and quantity of life in the presence of limited natural
resources.
Our paper is related to Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007) who have shown
2. The intergenerational elasticity of substitution is analogous to the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution but applied to di¤erent generations rather than di¤erent periods. See
Cordoba and Ripoll (2014).
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that population is e¢ cient in dynastic altruistic models of endogenous fertility
and xed land. The focus of their paper is not the Malthusian era and there-
fore they do not derive results about stagnation, the distribution of consumption
and population, nor di¤erential fertility. Moreover, they elaborate on the Pareto
concept of e¢ ciency while we study e¢ ciency from the point of view of utilitar-
ian social planners. Lucas (2002) studies equilibrium in Malthusian economies
populated by altruistic fully rational parents and shows that stagnation arises
under certain conditions. His focus is on simple representative economies where
fertility is equal across groups in steady state. Lucas discusses the di¢ culties in
generating social classes, and is able to generate classes by assuming heterogene-
ity in the degree of time preference and binding saving constraints. As a result,
the equilibrium with social classes is not e¢ cient in his model. We are able to
generate e¢ cient social classes and di¤erential fertility by allowing individuals
to di¤er in their labor skills and costs of raising children.
Our paper also relates to Dasgupta (2005) who studies optimal population
in an endowment economy with xed resources. He does not consider the cost
of raising children and focuses on the special case of generation-relative utili-
tarianism. Our model is richer in production, altruism, and the technology of
raising children. Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1986) shows that the population in
the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient under two possible externalities. First,
a larger population helps to provide more public goods such as national de-
fense. Second, larger population reduces wage rate if there is a xed amount
of land. Eckstein, Stern, and Wolpin (1988) show that population can stabilize
and non-subsistence consumption arises in the equilibrium when fertility choices
is endogenously introduced to a model with xed amount of land. Parents ex-
hibit warm glow altruism while our paper builds on pure altruism. Peretto
and Valente (2011) also use warm glow altruism to perform positive analysis
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on the interaction between resources, technology and population. De la Croix
(2012) studies sustainable population by proposing non-cooperative bargaining
between clans living on an island with limited resources. Children in his model
act like an investment good for parentsold-age support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general
stochastic model. Section 3 studies the deterministic representative agent ver-
sion of the general model and derives the main stagnation results. Section 4
considers deterministic heterogeneity and derives key results regarding the dis-
tribution of population and consumption across types, as well as the importance
of initial conditions for the steady state. Section 5 studies the full stochastic
model and derives the key result for di¤erential fertility, consumption, and pop-
ulation. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
II. The model
The production technology is described by the function F ( K;L;A) where
K is a xed amount of land, L is labor and A is a technological parameter. F
is constant returns to scale in K and L. Let 

K
L ; A

 FK( K;L;A) K
F( K;L;A)
be the
land share of output. The economy is populated by large numbers of dynastic
altruistic individuals who live for two periods, one as a child and one as an
adult. Children do not consume. Individuals are heterogeneous in terms of
their labor skills, rate of type preferences, and ability to raise children. In
particular, individuals draw a random signal, or type, ! 2 
  f!1; !2; :::; !Kg;
upon birth which denes his or her type. E¤ective labor supply, l (!) ; degree
of altruism, (n; !); and the goods and time costs of raising a child,  (!) and
 (!) ; are then functions of an individuals type. n is the number of children.
Signals are drawn from the Markov chain (!0; !) = Pr(!t+1 = !0j!t = !)
where !t is parents type and !t+1 is childs type. Assume  is irreducible. Let
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!t = [!0; !1; :::; !t] 2 
t+1 represent a particular family history of signals up to
time t while ct (!t) and nt (!t) denote consumption and fertility of an individual
with that family history.
II.A. Resource constraints
Let Nt (!t) be the population with history !t and Nt 
P
!t Nt (!
t) be
total population at time t: Initial levels of population of each type, N0 (!i),
!i 2 
; are given. Assuming a law of large numbers, the population with
history !t 2 
t+1 is described by
(1) Nt
 
!t

= Nt 1
 
!t 1

nt 1
 
!t 1

 (!t; !t 1) for t  0:
Fertility rates are assumed to be subject to a biological maximum n. The poten-
tial population at history !t is therefore N t (!t) = N t 1
 
!t 1

n (!t; !t 1)
with N0
 
!0

= N0 (!0) : Aggregate labor supply satises
(2) Lt =
X
!t
Nt
 
!t

l (!t)

1  t (!t)nt
 
!t

for t  0;
where l (!t) [1  t (!t)nt (!t)] is e¤ective individual labor supply of a partic-
ular type once time costs of raising children and individuals ability are taken
into account. Finally, aggregate resource constraints are given by
(3) F ( K;Lt;A) =
X
!t
Nt
 
!t
 
ct
 
!t

+  (!t)nt
 
!t

for t  0:
II.B. Individual welfare
Parents are assumed to be altruistic toward their children. The lifetime
utility of an individual born at time t  0; history !t; Ut (!t) ; is of the expected-
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utility type:
(4) Ut
 
!t

=
u (ct (!
t)) +  (nt (!
t) ; !)E

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t
+ ( (n; !)   (nt (!t) ; !))U;
where u () is the utility ow from consumption,  (; !) is the weight that a
parent of type ! attaches to the welfare of her n born children,  (n; !)  
 (n; !) is the weight attached to the unborn children, E

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t is
the expected utility of a born child conditional on parental history and U is the
utility of an unborn child as perceived by the parent. Function u satises u0 > 0
and u00 < 0: The population ethics literature refers to U as the "neutral" utility
level, a level above which a life is worth living (Blackorby et al. 2005, pg. 25).
Equation (4) describes parents as social planners at the family level. This
is particularly clear in the special case  (n; !) = n. The more general function
 (; !) allows for exible weights and time discounting. While  (n; !) is the
total weight of the n born children, n (n; !) is the marginal weight assigned to
child n 2 [0; n]. We assume n (n; ; !) > 0 and nn (n; !)  0 so that parents
are altruistic toward each child and altruism is non-increasing. These prefer-
ences are discussed in Cordoba and Ripoll (2011) who show that (4) satises a
fundamental axiom of altruism. Specically, parental utility increases with the
number of born children if and only if children are better o¤ born than unborn
in expected value, that is, E

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t > U:
Let  (!)   (1; !) be the discount factor,  (c)  u0(c)cu(c) be the elasticity
of the utility ow and  (n; !)  0(n;!)n(n;!) be the elasticity of the altruistic
function. Barro-Becker preferences are an special case obtained when u(c) = c

 ,
 (n; !) = n ; U = 0;  2 (0; 1) and  2 (; 1) :
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II.C. Social Welfare
The planner is envisioned as the ultimate parent, someone who cares about
the welfare of all potential individuals in the society. Consistent with (4), it is
natural to consider a social welfare function that takes the following generalized
total utilitarian form:
(5)
1X
t=0
t
"X
!t
	
 
Nt
 
!t

Ut
 
!t

+
 X
!t
	
 
N t
 
!t
 X
!t
	
 
Nt
 
!t
!
U
#
:
The parameter 0 <  < 1 reects time discounting while the function	 (Nt (!t)) ;
satisfying 	0 ()  0 and 	00 ()  0, is the planners weight of group Nt (!t).
The special case 	 (Nt (!t)) = Nt (!t) describes a classical total utilitarian
planner while 	 (Nt (!t)) = 1 describes an average utilitarian. The function
	 (N) = N p is the natural counterpart of Barro-Beckers altruism but ap-
plied to the planner. The welfare function (5) is a version of NGs (1986)
number-dampened total utility generalized to include multiple periods and time
discounting. Although our main results hold for a standard total utilitarian,
we extent our results to the number-dampening case for two reasons: (i) it is
natural given that parents in our model exhibit such behavior; and (ii) it turns
out to be important for time consistency and uniqueness of the steady state.
The case  = 0 is dened as
(6)
X
!
	 (N0 (!))U0 (!) :
It refers to a planner who cares only about the initial generation but also future
generations to the extent that the initial generation does. In this case social
discounting equals private discounting.  > 0 refers to a planner who is more
patient than individuals, as in Farhi and Werning (2007). The following assump-
tion bounds the extent to which the planner cares about future generations.
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Assumption 1.  < (!) for all !.
The role of Assumption 1 is tractability. The assumption is not particularly
restrictive because it still allows for the planner to care about future generations
more than parents do. We leave the more complicated case   (!) for the
Appendix. There we show that Malthusian stagnation still holds.
The standard reasoning for considering number dampening, or alternative
social criteria such as the "critical-level utilitarianism" of Blackorby and Donal-
son (1984), is to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. An allocation is "repugnant"
when it entails maximum population and minimum utility, or immiseration.
The Repugnant Conclusion is avoided in our environment, as we show below,
because parental rights are explicitly considered and children are costly to raise
(Hammond 1988).
We can now dene the planners problem.
Definition 1. Given an initial distribution of population fN0 (!)g!2
 ; the
planner chooses sequences

Ut (!
t) ; ct (!
t) ; nt (!
t) ; Nt+1
 
!t+1

; Lt
	
!t2
t+1;t0
to maximize social welfare (5) subject to sequences of resource constraints
(3), labor supply (2), laws of motions for population (1) and individual wel-
fare (4).
We assume throughout that the planners problem is well dened and refer
to its solution as the optimal or e¢ cient allocation. We also follow the standard
practice in population ethics of normalizing the utility level U to zero (e.g.,
Blackorby et al. 2005, pg. 25). This means that, in the mind of parents and the
planner, a life is worth living if and only if Ut (!t)  0: Since Ut can be written
as a discounted sum of utility ows, then the normalization requires u(c)  0.
For clarity, it is convenient to write the Lagrangian corresponding to the
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planners problem:
L =
X
t=0
t
X
!t
	
 
Nt
 
!t

Ut
 
!t

+
1X
t=0
X
!t
t
 
!t

Nt
 
!t
 
u(ct
 
!t

) + 
 
nt
 
!t

; !

EtUt+1
 
!t+1
  Ut  !t
+
1X
t=0
X
!t+1
t+1
 
!t+1
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1
  nt  !t (!t+1; !t)Nt  !t
+
1X
t=0
t
"
F ( K;Lt;A) 
X
!t
Nt
 
!t
 
ct
 
!t

+  (!t)nt
 
!t
#
+
1X
t=0
t
"X
!t
Nt
 
!t

l (!t)

1  t (!t)nt
 
!t
  Lt# ;
where

t (!
t) ; t+1
 
!t+1

; t; t
	
!t2
t+1;t0 are non-negative multipliers. We
assume parameters values are such that solutions are interior.3 The rst restric-
tion of the problem resembles a promise keeping constraint while the remaining
restrictions are resource constraints. The rst order conditions with respect to
fU0 (!0) ; Ut+1
 
!t+1

; Nt+1
 
!t+1

; nt (!
t) ; ct (!
t) ; Ltg!t2
t+1;t0 are:4
(7) 0 (!0)N0 (!0) = 	 (N0 (!0)) ;
t+1
 
!t+1

Nt+1
 
!t+1

(8)
= t+1	
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1

+ t
 
!t

Nt
 
!t


 
nt
 
!t

; !

 (!t+1; !t) ;
3. For example, the Barro-Becker model possesses an interior solution under certain para-
meter restrictions.
4. To avoid cumbersome notation, we do not introduce new notation to identify optimal
allocations. Allocations from now on should be regarded as optimal.
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t+1	0
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1

Ut+1
 
!t+1

+t+1l (!t+1)

1  t+1 (!t+1)nt+1
 
!t+1

+ t+1
 
!t+1

= t+1

ct+1
 
!t+1

+  (!t+1)nt+1
 
!t+1

+nt+1
 
!t+1
 X
!t+2j!t+1
t+2
 
!t+2


 
!t+2j!t+1 ;(9)
t
 
!t

n
 
nt
 
!t

; !

EtUt+1
 
!t+1

(10)
= t (!t) + tl (!t)t (!t) +
X
!t+1j!t
t+1
 
!t+1


 
!t+1j!t ;
(11) t
 
!t

u0(ct
 
!t

) = t;
(12) tFL;t = t:
This system of equations together with (1), (2), (3), (4) and proper transversality
conditions fully describe interior e¢ cient allocations. Equation (7) states that
the initial social value of providing utility to a particular group, 0 (!0)N0 (!0) ;
depends on the exogenous Pareto weight of group N0 (!0). Equation (8) then
allows to trace the dynamics of this value. The right hand side of the equation
is the marginal benet of promising utility Ut+1
 
!t+1

while the left hand side
is its marginal cost. Notice that if the Markov chain  is irreducible, the planner
eventually assigns social value, and therefore provides utility, to individuals of
all types just because all dynasties eventually have descendants of every type.
This would not be the case if  is reducible.
Equation (9) equates marginal benets to marginal costs of population. To
better understand this expression, assume for a moment that population is not
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constrained by (1), for example, because the planner have access to an in-
nite pool of immigrants. In that case t+1
 
!t+1

= 0 for all t and !t+1:
In other words,  is the value of an immigrant. The marginal benet of
an additional individual of type !t+1 includes her direct e¤ect in social wel-
fare, t+1	0
 
Nt+1
 
!t+1

Ut+1 plus her e¤ect in the labor supply, t+1l (!t+1)
 1  t+1 (!t+1)nt+1  !t+1 ; while the marginal cost includes the cost of
providing consumption and fertility to the individual, t+1[ct+1
 
!t+1

+  (!t+1)nt+1
 
!t+1

].
Adding restriction (1) makes the individual more valuable in the amount t+1
 
!t+1

because it relaxes the population constraint at t+1, but also increases marginal
costs because the planner needs to endow the individual with children at t+ 2:
The condition for optimal fertility is Equation (10). The marginal bene-
t of a child for an altruistic parent with history !t is the expected utility
of the child, EtUt+1; times the weight that the parent attaches to the child,
n (nt (!
t) ; !) : The marginal benet for the planner is this amount times
t (!
t) : The corresponding marginal cost of the child for the planner includes
good costs, t (!t), time costs, tl (!t) (!t), and the shadow costs of the
descendants,
P
!t+1j!t t+1
 
!t+1


 
!t+1j!t.
To characterize the solution of this system of equations, we focus primar-
ily on the steady state and proceed in three steps. First we characterize the
deterministic case with only one type (Section 3), then the case with multi-
ple but deterministic types (Section 4) and nally the stationary solution with
stochastic types. We show that Malthusian stagnation generally arises when
technological progress is of the land augmenting type meaning that steady state
optimal consumption allocations and fertility choices are independent of K and
A. We also characterize the optimal composition of population, the potential
dependence of the steady state land-labor ratio on initial conditions, and fertility
di¤erentials among types.
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III. Deterministic case with one type
This section considers the representative agent case with only one type.
We show that stagnation is e¢ cient if technological progress is of the land
augmenting type or the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Let n (!) = n;
 (!) = ; and l (!) = 1 for simplicity. In this case the resource constraint (3)
reduces to:
(13) F
 K
Nt
; 1  nt;A

= ct + nt:
Moreover, using (13), (11), and (12), equations (7) to (10) simplify to:
(14) 	 (N0) = 0N0;
(15) t+1	 (Nt+1) + tNt (nt) = t+1Nt+1;
(16) t+1	0 (Nt+1)Ut+1 + t+1 = t+1FK;t+1
K
Nt+1
+ nt+1t+2; and
(17) 0 (nt)
Ut+1
u0(ct)
=  + FL;t+
t+1
t
t
t
:
Equation (16) is obtained from (9) after using (12), (13) and the constant returns
to scale assumption. Equation (17) is obtained from (10), (11), and (12).
III.A. Steady state
Consider a steady state situation in which N and c are constant while the
present value Lagrange multipliers grow at a constant rate, possibly zero. In that
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case n = 1 and Equation (15) can be written as t+1=t =  +
t+1	(N)
Nt
 :
Under Assumption 1, the ratio 
t+1	(N)
Nt
goes to zero in the limit. Therefore
t+1=t =  in a steady state. Moreover, Equation (11) becomes tu0(c) = t
so that t+1=t = t+1=t = . Equation (16) can be written as:
t+1	0 (N)U=t+1 + 1 =
t+1
t+1
FK
K
N
+
t+2
t+1
:
It is easy to see that
t+1
t
=  or
t+1
t
=  are the only two potential steady
state growth rates satisfying this equation. However, if
t+1
t
=  then the rst
term would be constant in a steady state but the term
t+1
t+1
would be exploding
because  grows at the rate  > : Thus
t+1
t
=  is not a steady state solution.
Hence, the only solution is
t+1
t
=  so that the rst term in the equation above
becomes zero in steady state simplifying the expression to5
(18)
t
t
=
FK
K
N
1   =
F

K
N ; 1  ;A

  FL (1  )
1   :
Equation (18) states that the steady state value of an immigrant in units of
goods,  , is the present value of "land rents". On the other hand, equation (4)
simplies in steady state to U = u(c)1  : Therefore, Equation (17) can be written,
using the results obtained for U , tt ;
t+1
t
and the denitions of  and  as:
(19)  (1) c=(c) = (1  )  + (  )FL + F
 K
N
; 1  ;A

:
This equation together with the resource constraint
(20) F
 K
N
; 1  ;A

= c+ 
5. If    then the steady state system is more complex because the terms t+1	(N)
Nt
and
t+1	0(N)U
t+1
do not vanish. We study this case in the Appendix.
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form a system of two equations in two unknowns: c and N . They can be used
to write consumption as:
(21) c =
(c)=
 (1)  (c) [ + FL (  )] :
This expression is analogous to the one obtained by Barro and Becker (1989)
who show that consumption is proportional to the net costs of raising a child: +
FL FL. For example, if  =  and (c) =  then consumption is proportional
to . The parametric restriction  (1) > (c) is needed for consumption to be
positive. An implication is that immiseration and the Repugnant conclusion,
c = 0 andN =1, is not optimal unless the net cost of children is zero. Equation
(21) is not a nal solution for consumption because FL still needs to be solved
for. For this purpose, write (19), using the constant returns to scale assumption
for F and the denition of ; the land share of output, to obtain:
c =
(c)=
 (1)

 (1  ) +

(  ) (1  )
1   + 

F
 K
N
; 1  ;A

:
Finally, using (20) and collecting terms, consumption can be solved as
(22) c = (c)
1      (  )
( (1)  (c)) (1  )  (c) (1  ) (  ) :
This expression describes e¢ cient steady state consumption as long as the ex-
pression is non-negative.6 A su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for this
to be the case is   : We can now state our rst main result: Malthusian
stagnation is e¢ cient under general conditions.
Proposition 2. Suppose the steady state is interior. Then, in a steady state
e¢ cient consumption is independent of the amount of land while e¢ cient
6. If the denominator is negative the e¢ cient allocation is not interior.
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population increases proportionally with the amount of land. Furthermore,
if technological progress is land augmenting then e¢ cient consumption is
independent of the level of technology while e¢ cient population increases
proportionally with the level of technology.
Intuitively, land discoveries do not a¤ect the land share because population
increases to exactly match the extra land leaving consumption and land-labor
ratio, the solutions to equations (20) and (22) unchanged. Furthermore, land
augmenting technological progress acts analogously to land discoveries. Notice
that the proposition hold for general functions F , u and . A particular case is
the Barro-Becker formulation.
IV. Deterministic case with multiple types
Consider now the case of multiple deterministic types. Specically, suppose
!t = [!; !; !:::] or just !t = ! for short. We assume in this section  = 0: This
restriction is without much loss in generality since similar steady state results
would be obtained as long as  <  (!), as shown in the previous section. For
tractability, we also restrict altruism to be of the Barro-Becker form,  (n; !) =
 (!)n but still allow more general formulations for u and F .
We show the following results in this section. First, if  (!) is di¤erent for
di¤erent types then their population sizes grow at di¤erent rates and in steady
state only the most patient groups, the ones with highest  (!) ; survive. This
result implies that e¢ cient social classes cannot be sustained by persistent di¤er-
ences in rates of time preference. Lucas (2002) is able to generate social classes
using such a mechanism in a competitive equilibrium with savings constraints
which suggests that social classes are not e¢ cient, in the rst best sense, in his
model.
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As an alternative to Lucas (2002), we are able to generate multiple social
classes using a more standard mechanism based on heterogeneity in labor skills,
l (!), and the cost of raising children,  (!) and  (!) : This is the second main
result of the section. E¢ ciency requires to provide more consumption to indi-
viduals with higher costs of raising children. Consumption also increases with
labor ability, l(!), but only if  (!) > , that is, only if the time costs of raising
children are su¢ ciently high. Otherwise, the e¢ cient allocation involves the
high skilled having lower consumption.7
Third, we show that relative population sizes of various types are inversely
related to their relative consumption. Therefore, the population of the poor
is larger than the population of the middle class and so on. The planner thus
faces a quantity-quality trade-o¤: she can deliver certain level of welfare by allo-
cating children and/or consumption. If children are particularly costly to raise
for a certain group, then the planner optimally delivers welfare more through
consumption than through children and vice versa.
Fourth, in the deterministic steady state of this section all types have one
child and therefore steady state welfare di¤erences among types only arise from
di¤erences in consumption. As a result, types with lower consumption are worse-
o¤ than types with higher consumption. All benets from a larger population
accrue only to early members of the dynasty at the expense of later members.
IV.A. Dynamics
The following lemma characterizes the evolution of e¢ cient population sizes
of di¤erent types over time.
7. This result could rationalize, for example, why high skilled women may end up having
more children and low consumption compared with an equally skilled man. Extending the
model to introduce gender di¤erences is a promising agenda for future research.
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Lemma 3. Let (!; !0) 2 
: E¢ cient population sizes satisfy:
(23)
Nt (!)
Nt (!0)
=

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
   1  " 	 (N0 (!))
	 (N0 (!0))
 (!)
t
u0(ct (!))
 (!0)t u0(ct (!0))
# 1
1  
:
We characterize next the steady state.
IV.B. Steady state
IV.B..1 Distribution of population
Consider now a steady state in which consumption, population shares and
population are constant. This requires n (!) = 1 for all types. In that case,
equation (23) simplies to:
(24)
N (!)
N (!0)
=

 (!)
 (!0)
 t
1  

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
   1   	 (N0 (!))
	 (N0 (!0))
u0(c (!))
u0(c (!0))
 1
1  
:
We can now state our second main result which is apparent from this equa-
tion.
Proposition 4. In an interior steady state: (i) Only the most patient types,
the ones with the highest  (!) ; have positive mass; (ii) The distribution
of population depends on the initial distribution unless 	 (N0) = N ; In
particular, it depends on the initial distribution in the classical utilitarian
case; (iii) The relative population size of a particular type is inversely related
to its per-capita consumption.
The rst part of the proposition states that impatient types eventually disap-
pear from the economy. Children are like an investment for altruistic parents as
they deliver a stream of future utility ows. Impatient individuals discount fu-
ture streams more heavily and therefore value children less than patient individ-
uals do. As a result, it is e¢ cient for the planner to provide more consumption
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to current individuals in exchange for fewer future family members.8
The second part of Proposition 4 states that the steady state distribution
of population depends on initial conditions, a result that is analogous to the
dependence of the steady state wealth distribution on initial conditions in the
neoclassical growth model (Chatterjee 1994). However, as we see below, this de-
pendence has more profound implications in Malthusian economics because the
steady state aggregate land-labor ratio and steady state population depends on
initial conditions, and Pareto weights, as well. This is in contrast to the neoclas-
sical growth model where the golden rule level of capital is independent of initial
conditions and Pareto weights. E¢ ciency and distribution are interdependent
in Malthusian economies unless Pareto weights are of the form 	 (N0) = N ,
that is, Pareto weights resemble parental weights.
The third part of Proposition 4 shows a fundamental prediction of endoge-
nous population models: an inverse relationship between population size and
per-capita consumption. The lower the consumption of a type the larger its
share of the total population. The reason is that the planner needs to deliver
welfare by providing consumption and children to parents. Whenever the plan-
ner chooses to use one channel then it downplays the other.
We still need to solve for consumption to fully derive the consequences of
this inverse relationship. For the rest of this section it is convenient to assume
a specic functional form for 	 (N) ; 	 (N) = N p ; and restrict attention to
the set of most patient types, 
p  
. That is,  (!) =  for all ! 2 
p and
   (!) for all ! 2 
: Equation (24) thus simplies to:
(25)
N (!)
N (!0)
=

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  

u0(c (!))
u0(c (!0))
 1
1  
; ! 2 
p:
8. This result also helps qualify a common view that the poor are inherently more im-
patient, less willing to save, and that their large families somehow reects their impatience.
According to our model, if the poor were really impatient, they would have fewer children and
their type would eventually disappear from the population.
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Thus, the long term composition of the population depends on the initial dis-
tribution unless  p =  . Moreover, the initial distribution of population tend
to persist if  p >  : Classical utilitarianism is represented by  p = 1: In this
case, the steady state distribution never resembles the initial distribution unless
consumptions are equal across types which is not the case in general, as we show
below.9
The following lemma characterizes the steady state distribution of popula-
tion in terms of consumptions.
Lemma 5. Let p (!)  N(!)N : Then
(26) p (!) =
N0 (!)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )P
!0 N0 (!
0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!0))1=(1  )
:
The lemma is important because it provides a simple description of the
steady state distribution of population in terms of the given initial distribution
and steady state consumptions.
IV.B..2 Consumption
One can show, similarly to the rst part of Proposition 4, that only the
most patient types have positive consumption in steady state. According to
(11), for consumption to be constant t+1(!)t(!) =
t+1
t
is required. Otherwise,
t+1(!)
t(!)
<
t+1
t
refers to a type for which consumption falls, and vice versa.
Therefore, only the types with the highest ratio t+1(!)t(!) have positive steady
state consumption. Moreover, according to (8), t+1(!)t(!) =  (1; !) =  (!) at
steady state. Therefore, t+1(!)t(!) is the highest for all ! 2 
p:
The following Lemma provides the solution for consumptions in terms of
9. In the utilitarian case, e¢ cient allocations are not time consistent because re-optimizing
starting with an initial steady state distribution of population results in a di¤erent steady
state distribution.
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population shares and the marginal product of labor.
Lemma 6. E¢ cient consumption satises:
(27) c (!) =
 (c (!)) =
    (c (!)) [ (!) + ( (!)  )FLl (!)] for ! 2 
p:
Equation (27), analogous to (21), shows that consumption is proportional
to the net nancial cost of a child. In particular consumption is larger for types
with higher cost of raising children, either higher  (!) and/or higher  (!) : The
relationship between skills, l (!), and consumption is slightly more complicated.
If  (!) >  then e¢ cient consumption is higher for high skilled individuals. But
if  (!) < ; then e¢ cient consumption is actually lower for the high skilled.
We can now state the third main result of the paper which follows from (24)
and (27).
Proposition 7. The steady state e¢ cient allocation exhibits inequality of con-
sumptions and populations. Types with low consumption have larger popu-
lation.
Proposition 7 is important for at least three reasons. First, as is discussed by
Lucas (2002), obtaining an e¢ cient allocation with heterogeneous social classes
in Malthusian economies is not trivial yet important. Lucass solution, which
relies on di¤erences in time discounting, generates ine¢ cient social classes in
presence of binding constraints. Di¤erent discount factors would still lead to
only one social group surviving in steady state in an e¢ cient allocation. Second,
the e¢ cient allocation can rationalize a distribution of social classes in which
the poor are a larger fraction of the population. Third, the proposition also
states that, in a world where the planner can choose which types survive and
which types disappear, it is not optimal to end a lineage just because it is of
lower skill or poorer. This is in contrast to a literature that argues in favor
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of limiting the fertility of the poor (e.g., Chu and Koo, 1990). Only impatient
types disappear from an e¢ cient allocation.
It is possible to nd nal solution for consumptions and relative population
sizes without knowing the marginal product of labor in the following special
Barro-Becker case.
Example 8. Suppose u(c) = c= with  2 (0; 1); (n) = n ;  2 (; 1);
	 (N) = N and  (!) = . Then
c (!) =

   
 (!)

and
N (!)
N (!0)
=

 (!0)
 (!)
 1 
1  
:
In this example, consumption is proportional to the goods cost of raising a
child,  (!) ; while the exponent 1 1  2 (1;1) controls the extent to which con-
sumption inequality translates into population inequality. Since the restriction
 >  is needed for an interior solution, the exponent is larger than 1. There-
fore, population inequality is larger than consumption inequality. For example,
if consumption of the rich is 5 times that of the poor,
(!0)
(!) = 5, and
1 
1  = 2
then the population of the poor is 25 times that of the rich. The planner in this
example is more willing to accept a large share of poor individuals when inter-
generational substitution of consumption is particularly low ( is low) and/or
parental altruism does not decrease sharply with family size ( is high).
IV.B..3 Average output
A full solution requires to nd the marginal product of labor which itself
requires a solution for the land-labor ratio. For this purpose, rewrite the steady-
state resource constraint as
LF
 
K=L; 1

= N
X
!
p (!) [c (!) +  (!)] :
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Furthermore, total labor supply relative to population is expressed, at steady
state, by
(28)
L
N
=
X
!
p (!) l (!) [1   (!)] :
Dividing these two equations yields
(29)
F
L
= F
 K
L
; 1

=
P
! p (!) [c (!) +  (!)]P
! p (!) l (!) [1   (!)]
:
The system of three set of equations, (26), (27) and (29), can then be used to
solve for the following unknowns: p (!) ; c (!) and L.
IV.B..4 Stagnation
Combining (29) and (27), and using the Cobb-Douglas production function
one obtains:
c (!)
(30)
=
 (c (!)) =
    (c (!))

 (!) + ( (!)  ) (1  )
P
! p (!) [c (!) +  (!)]P
! p (!) l (!) [1   (!)]
l (!)

Equations (26) and (30) can be use to solve for c (!) and p (!) : Notice that as
long as  is independent of K and A, so are c (!) and p (!) : Once these two
variables are solved for then (29) can be used to solve for L and (28) for N . The
following Proposition summarizes these results. The proof is similar to that of
Proposition 2 and hence omitted.
Proposition 9. Suppose  = 0;  (n; !) = n and the steady state is interior.
Then: (i) in steady state optimal consumption is independent of the amount
of land and optimal population is proportional to the amount of land; (ii)
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if technological progress is land augmenting then optimal consumption is
independent of the level of technology and population increases proportion-
ally with the level of technology; and (iii) optimal allocations depend on the
initial distribution of population unless 	(N0) = N
 
0 :
V. Stochastic case
The deterministic version of the model considered so far counterfactually
predicts equal fertility among di¤erent social groups. Malthus, however ob-
served that fertility rates were higher among the poor. We now show that a
version of the model with stochastic types can generate di¤erential fertility. For
tractability we once again assume  = 0 and use the Barro-Becker functional
forms:  (n; !) = n and u(c) = c=: Equation (8) can be simplied, using
equation (11) and the law of motion for population, equation (1), as:
(31)
 (nt (!
t))
nt (!t)
=
t+1
t
u0(ct (!t))
u0(ct+1 (!t+1))
:
An implication of this equation is that all children within a family have the
same consumption:
(32) ct+1
 
!t;!t+1

= ct+1
 
!t

for all !t+1 2 
:
The following Lemma shows that optimal consumption allocations are his-
tory independent and satisfy a formulation similar to that of Equations (21) or
(27). In particular, the consumption of a child is proportional to the expected
net costs of raising that child.
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Lemma 10. Optimal consumption satises:
(33)
ct+1 (!t) =

   

t
t+1
 (!t) +
t
t+1
FL;tl (!t) (!t)  FL;t+1Et (l (!t+1))

:
Notice that according to the lemma ct+1
 
!t+1

= ct+1 (!t) so that e¢ cient
consumption is not history dependent. Similarly, substituting (33) into (31), it
follows that nt (!t) = nt (!t 1; !t) so that the number of children only depends
on the types of the parent and grandparent.
V.A. Steady state
Consider now stationary steady state allocations in which nt (!t 1; !t) =
n (!t 1; !t) ; ct (!t 1) = c (!t 1), Nt (!t) = N (!t 1; !t) and Nt = Nt+1. Let
R  tt+1 be the planners shadow gross return and with a little bit abuse
of notation let p (!t 1; !t)  N(!t 1;!t)Nt be the population share with recent
history (!t; !t 1). The following Lemma summarizes the system of equations
and unknowns describing stationary steady state.
Lemma 11. Steady state allocations, c (!) ; n (! 1; !) ; p (! 1; !) ; R; L and N
are solved from the following systems of equations:
(34) c (!) =
R
    [ (!) + FLl (!) (!)  FLE [l (!+1) j!] =R] ;
(35) n (! 1; !) =

R
u0(c (!))
u0(c (! 1))
 1
1  
;
(36) p (!; !+1) =
X
! 1
n (! 1; !) (!+1; !) p (! 1; !) ;
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(37)
X
! 1
X
!
p (! 1; !)n (! 1; !t) = 1;
(38) F
 K
L
; 1;A

=
N
L
X
! 1
X
!
p (! 1; !) [c (! 1) +  (!)n (! 1; !)] ;
(39)
L
N
=
X
! 1
X
!
p (! 1; !) l (!) (1   (!)n (! 1; !)) :
Equation (34) shows the consumption of an individual whose parent is of
type !: Consumption is positively associated with the parental costs of raising
children and parental skills and negatively associated with the expected skills
of the child.
Equation (35) shows fertility di¤erentials among di¤erent types. Optimal
fertility depends on parental and grandparent types. Given grandparent types,
parents with low consumption have more children than parents with high con-
sumption. Also, given parent types, consumption rich grandparents have more
grandchildren than consumption poor grandparents. Equation (37), which in
principle serves to solve R, restricts fertility to be one on average. Equations
(38) and (39) are resource constraints of goods and labor.
The next Proposition shows that the stagnation property still holds in the
stochastic case.
Proposition 12. Suppose the steady state is interior. Then, steady state op-
timal consumption is independent of the amount of land and optimal pop-
ulation increases proportionally with the amount of land. Furthermore, if
technological progress is land augmenting then optimal consumption is in-
dependent of the level of technology and population increases proportionally
with the level of technology.
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To summarize, in addition to stagnation, the key properties of the stochastic
steady state are di¤erential fertility and heterogeneous social groups. Moreover,
all types, or social groups, are represented in a steady state even if their initial
population is zero as long as  is non-reducible.
VI. Concluding comments
The pre-industrial world was to a large extent Malthusian. As documented
by Ashraf and Galor (2011), periods characterized by improvements in tech-
nology or in the availability of land eventually lead to a larger but not richer
population. This is remarkable given the diversity of political, social, religious,
geographical, cultural, and economic environments they considered, some ar-
guably more advanced than others. Why were no particular systems able or
willing to control population size to avoid the Malthusian trap?
We show that even in the best case scenario of a Malthusian economy pop-
ulated by loving rational parents and governed by an all powerful benevolent
rational planner, stagnation, inequality, high population of the poor and dif-
ferential fertility could still naturally arise as an optimal choice. Our ndings
thus help explain why the Malthusian trap was so pervasive in pre-industrial
societies. We also show that is not the irrational animal spirit of human beings,
as suggested by Malthus, what ultimately explains the stagnation. Stagnation
can be the result of an optimal choice between the quality and quantity of life
in the presence of limited natural resources.
Finally, this article proposes and implements a novel approach to study issues
of e¢ ciency when the population is endogenous. We solve the planners problem
in a novel and tractable way. We expect this methodology to further facilitate
the integration of demographics and macroeconomics.
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Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 2. Equation (22) is the nal solution for consumption
if the technology is Cobb-Douglas because in that case  is a parameter. This
equation shows that c is independent of land K and technology A when F is
Cobb-Douglas for general functions u and : Otherwise,  is not a parameter
and equations (20) and (22) need to be solved simultaneously for c and N . How-
ever, one can show that c is independent of the amount of land. To see this,
let c(K0) and N(K0) be the steady state solutions when K0 is the amount of
land and let K1 be a di¤erent amount. Consider the solution c(K1) = c(K0)
and N(K1) = K1K0=N(K0) . L0 = N (K0) (1  ) and L1 = N (K1) (1  ). Notice
that the proposed solution when K = K1 exhibits the same land labor ratio
as the solution for K0 and therefore it still solves equation (20). Furthermore
(K1) =
FK(K1;L1;A)K1
F (K1;L1;A)
= FK(K1=L1;1;A)F (1;L1=K1;A) =
FK(K0=L0;1;A)
F (1;L0=K0;A)
so that the land share
is unchanged. As a result, c(K0) still solves (22) when K = K1. Finally, land
augmenting technological progress implies F

K
N ; 1  ;A

= F

A K
N ; 1  

:
Let c(A0) and N(A0) be the e¢ cient steady state for the level of technology
A0 and let A1 be a di¤erent level. Consider the solution c(A1) = c(A0) and
N(A1) =
A1K
A0K=N(A0)
: Notice that the proposed solution when A = A1 ex-
hibits the same e¤ective land labor ratio as the solution for A0 and therefore it
still solves equation (20). Furthermore  = FK(A1K;L1)A1KF (A1K;L1) =
FK(A1K=L1;1)
F (1;L1=(A1K))
=
FK(A0K=L0;1)
F (1;L0=(A0K))
so that the land share is unchanged. As a result, c(A0) still solves
(22).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let st (!)  t (!)Nt (!) : Equation (8), given that  = 0
is assumed, can then be written as:
s1 (!) = s0 (!)  (n0 (!)) ; s2 (!) = s0 (!)
1Y
i=0
 (ni (!)) :
More generally, st (!) = s0 (!)
t 1Y
i=0
 (ni (!)) : Assuming  (n) =  (!)n ; it
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follows that:
st (!) = s0 (!) (!)
t
 
t 1Y
i=0
ni (!)
! 
= 0 (!)N0 (!) (!)
t

Nt (!)
N0 (!)
 
= 0 (!) (N0 (!))
1  
 (!)
t
(Nt (!))
 
:(40)
Now, (11) can be written as tNt (!) = st (!)u
0(ct (!)): Therefore
Nt (!)
Nt (!0)
=
st (!)u
0(ct (!))
st (!0)u0(ct (!0))
:
Substituting (40) into this equation gives
Nt (!)
Nt (!0)
=
0 (!) (N0 (!))
1  
 (!)
t
(Nt (!))
 
u0(ct (!))
0 (!0) (N0 (!0))
1  
 (!0)t (Nt (!0))
 
u0(ct (!0))
:
Finally, use (7) to substitute 0 (!) and solve for
Nt(!)
Nt(!0)
to obtain (23).
Proof of Lemma 5. According to equation (25), and let !0 = !0,
N (!) = N (!0)

N0 (!)
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )
u0(c (!0))1=(1  )
:
Adding N (!) over !;
N =
X
!
N (!) =
N (!0)
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!0))1=(1  )
X
!
N0 (!)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )
and therefore
p (!0) =
N (!0)
N
=
N0 (!0)
 p  
1  u0(c (!0))1=(1  )P
! N0 (!)
 p  
1  u0(c (!))1=(1  )
for all !0 2 
p:
Proof of Lemma 6. Rewrite (9) using (12) as:
1 =
t+1
t+1 (!)
[c (!) +  (!)  FLl (!) (1   (!))] +
t+2 (!)
t+1 (!)
:
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Since
t+2(!)
t+1(!)
is constant in steady state then
t+1
t+1(!)
needs to be constant for
this equation to hold, which means that
t+1(!)
t(!)
=
t+1
t
= : The last equality
holds by (11) and (15). Therefore, the previous equation can be written as:
(41)
t (!)
t
=
1
1   [c (!) +  (!)  FLl (!) (1   (!))] :
This expression states that the value of an immigrant in terms of goods, t(!)t ;
is the net present value of the net cost. In steady state U(c (!)) = u(c(!))1  : Use
this result, (11) and (12) to rewrite (10) as:
(42)
0 (1)
1  
u(c (!))
u0(c (!))
=  (!) + FLl (!) (!) + 
t (!)
t
:
One can combine equation (41) and (42) to solve for consumption as
0 (1)
 (c (!))
c (!)
= ( (!) + FLl (!) (!)) (1   (1)) +  (c (!) +  (!)  FLl (!) (1   (!)))
=  (!) + FLl (!) (!) +  (c (!)  FLl (!))
or
c (!) =
 (c (!))
0 (1)   (c (!)) [ (!) + ( (!)  )FLl (!)] :
Using (n) = n provides the result.
Proof of Lemma 10. Write Equation (9), the optimality condition for popu-
lation, as:
(43)
t
 
!t

+tl (!t) tct
 
!t

= nt
 
!t
 " t (!t) + tl (!t)t (!t)
+
P
!t+1j!t t+1
 
!t+1


 
!t+1j!t
#
:
Moreover, use (11) to rewrite the rst order condition with respect to fertility,
Equation (10), as
(44)
EtUt+1 =
u0(ct (!t))
t
t (!t) + tl (!t) (!t) +
P
!t+1j!t t+1
 
!t+1


 
!t+1j!t
n (nt (!t))
:
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Using (31), Equation (44) can be written as:
(45)
EtUt+1 =
u0(ct+1
 
!t+1

)
t+1
t (!t) + tl (!t) (!t) +
P
!t+1j!t t+1
 
!t+1


 
!t+1j!t
 
Plugging (43) into (44),
(46) EtUt+1 =
u0(ct (!t))
t
t (!
t) + tl (!t)  tct (!t)
nt (!t) n (nt (!t))
:
Plugging (46) into the individuals value function (4):
Ut
 
!t

= u
 
ct
 
!t

+ 
 
nt
 
!t

; !
 u0(ct (!t))
t
t (!
t) + tl (!t)  tct (!t)
nt (!t) n (nt (!t))
= u0(ct
 
!t

)

1

  1
 

ct
 
!t

+
1
 
1
t
 
t
 
!t

+ tl (!t)

Forwarding this equation one period ahead and taking a conditional expected
value, Et:
EtUt+1(47)
= u0(ct+1
 
!t+1

)

ct+1
 
!t+1
1

  1
 

+

1
 
1
t+1

Ett+1
 
!t+1

+ t+1Etl (!t+1)

As shown in equation (32) consumption of every individual depends only on the
ability of his/her parent, while the aggregate terms t+1 and t+1 are deter-
ministic since there is no aggregate risk. Finally, equating (45) and (47), using
(12) and simplifying one obtains (33).
Proof of Proposition 11. At steady state, (33) becomes (34), (35) can be
obtained using Equation (31) and the specied functional forms, the law of mo-
tion of population (1) becomes (36), total population is constant and therefore
average fertility is equal to 1 as stated by (37). Equations (38) and (39) are
steady state versions of (2) and (3).
Proof of Proposition 12. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and uses
guess and verify. A longer direct proof is also possible. Consider the solution for
an initial amount of land, say K0. Let K0N0 and L0 be the steady state solution
of land-population ratio and labor for K0. Then consider a di¤erent amount
of land, say K1. Guess that the solution for the new steady state is identical
to the initial solution except for two changes: N1 = K1=K0N0 so that the land-
labor ratio is unchanged, and L1 = N1 L0N0 so that the labor-population ratio
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is unchanged. Notice that under the proposed solution the marginal product
of labor is unchanged too. One can then use Lemma 11 to verify that under
the proposed guess, the solutions for consumption, fertility, the distribution
of population and R that solve for K0 also solve for K1. Similarly for land-
augmenting technological progress, guess that population responds to keep AKL
unchanged for di¤erent levels of A, while labor responds to keep the ratio LN
unchanged, and nothing else changes. One veries that the proposed solution
satises all equations in Lemma 11.
A.2. Deterministic case with one type.
A.2.1.Case   :
Lemma 13. Assume  > 0 and the production function F (; ) satises Inada
condition and
lim
L!1
FKL
 
K;L

= 0:
(i) If  > , a steady state satises the following equations:
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
   
(1  ) (   1)(48)
=
 (c)
c

0 (1)
c
 (c)
1
1      + F
 K
N
; 1  ;A


   1  
(1  )
1  

:
(49) F
 K
N
; 1  ;A

= c+ 
and
t+1
t
=
t+1
t
=
t+1
t
= :
(ii) If  = , the steady state does not exist.
Proof.(i) When  > 0; N is nite. Consider rst the case  > : One can rst
show that t+1=t = : Otherwise if t+1=t > ; then in the limit, according to
equation (15),
(50) t+1=t =  +
t+1	 (N)
Nt
then t+1=t =  < , a contradiction. If t+1=t < , then the right hand side
of (50) explodes which also leads to a contradiction. ((11)) then implies that
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the growth rate of t is the same as that of t, which is . Furthermore, (16) at
steady state simplies to:
(51) 	0 (N)U   t+1
t+1
FK
K
N
=
t+1
t+1

t+2
t+1
  1

:
The left hand side of this equality is constant in steady state since the growth
rate of  is : Then for the right hand side to converge to a constant we have
the following three possibilities: t grows at a rate smaller than , t grows at
the rate , and t keeps constant over time, e.g.
t+2
t+1
= 1. Consider the rst
possibility when t grows at a rate smaller than , then
(52) 	0 (N)U =
t+1
t+1
FK
K
N
Express (15) and (11) at steady state,
t+1
Nt
	 (N) +  (1) =  ) t = 
t+1	 (N)
N (   )
(53) t = tu
0(c) =
t+1	 (N)
N (   ) u
0 (c)
Plug it into (52) multiplied by N	(N) which is zero,
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
U =

    u
0 (c)FK
K
N
) N	
0 (N)
	 (N)
c =
 (1  )
     (c)FK
K
N
By the constant return to scale assumption and the denition of  above, it can
be written as
(54)
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
c
 (c)
=
 (1  )
    
F
 
K;L;A

N
which together with (49) and L = N (1  ) can be used to solve (c;N). Express
(17) at steady state as
(55) 0 (1)
c
 (c)
1
1   =  + (1  )
F
 
K;L;A

N

1  
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which uses the result that t grows at the rate  according to (53): (c;N) solved
from (54) and (49) do not satisfy (55) in general. Therefore, in the case of 
bigger than ; the steady state with each multiplier growing at a constant rate,
in particular t growing at a constant rate smaller than , is not the optimal
solution except for a knife-edge condition in which (c;N) satises (49), (54),
and (55) simultaneously. Next consider the second possibility when t grows at
the rate of . Express (15), (17) and (11) at steady state, respectively, as
t+1
Nt
	 (N) +  (1) =  ) t = 
t+1	 (N)
N (   ) ;
t =
1

t

0 (1)
U
u0(c)
     FL

;
and
t = tu
0(c) =
t+1	 (N)
N (   ) u
0 (c) :
Plug t+1 into the steady state formula of ((16)),
t+1
t+1
	0 (N)U =
t+2	 (N)
t+1N (   )
u0 (c)FK
K
N
+    1:
Plug t+1 into it,
t+1
t+1
	0 (N)U =

0 (1) Uu0(c)      FL
FK
K
N
+    1
Manipulate terms and use the formula of ; we obtain
N	0 (N)
	 (N)
1
1  
=
   1
   
 (c)
c

0 (1) c
1
 (c)
1
1      + F
 K
N
; 1  ;A


   1  
(1  )
1  

:
which together with (49) solves (c;N) : For the third possibility
t+1
t
= 1 at
steady state, which together with
t+1
t
=  < 1 contradicts with equation (17).
(ii) If  = , (15) becomes
t+1
t
=
t+1
t
	 (N)
N
+   :
If t+1t = ; then limt!1
t+1
t
	(N)
N > 0 and
t+1
t
converges to a number strictly
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bigger than  and a contradiction arises since N > 0 when  > 0. If t+1t > ,
then t+1t = limt!1
t+1
t
	(N)
N = 0, a contradiction. Hence steady state with
Lagrange multipliers growing at constant rate over time does not exist if  > 0
which requires N to be nite.
A.2.2. Stability of the steady state
To get some insights about the stability of the steady state, in this section
we also focus on the case when  = 0, in which case the social planner only cares
about future generations to the extent that the initial generation does. The cost
of raising children is only in terms of goods cost, which implies  = 0. Further-
more, assume the social planners weight and parental altruism functions take
the Barro Beckers form. They are  (N) = N and  (n) = n , respectively.
We still assume u (c) = c

 : Then the initial parents utility is
U0 = u (c0) + n
 
0 U1 =
1X
t=0
t
Yt 1
j=0
n j u (ct)
The social planners objective is
 (N0)U0 = N
 
0
1X
t=0
t
Yt 1
j=0
n j
1

ct =
1X
t=0
tN t
1

ct
The weight on every individual living in generation t is tN t . Then the problem
becomes
max
fCt;Nt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tN t
1

ct
subject to
ctNt = F
 
K;Nt;A
 Nt+1
where ct is the per capita consumption of every individual belonging to gen-
eration t. Let the production take the Cobb-Douglas form, e.g. F
 
K;Nt;A

=
A KN1 t : The optimality choice of population in period t is
N  t C
 1
t  = N
  
t+1 C
 1
t+1

 

  

A KN t+1   
   

Nt+2
Nt+1

where Ct = ctNt is the aggregate consumption of all people of generation t: Let
Xt  N (  )=(1 )t Ct; the aggregate consumption times a factor that depends
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on population of time t. Then the following two equations characterize the
dynamics of the system:
(56) Xt = N
  
1 
t

A KN1 t  Nt+1

(57)

Xt+1
Xt
1 
 = 

 

  

A KN t+1   
   

Nt+2
Nt+1

Steady state population, N, can be solved as
A KN  =
    + =
    :
Stability of this steady state can be obtained by analyzing the log linearized
the system represented by a matrix form"
N
(1  )=(1 )
X 1
    1  
#"
dNt+2
N
dXt+1
X
#
(58)
=
"
(    ) = (1  ) + (1  )

1 + N
(1  )=(1 )
X

0
(1  )       1  
#"
dNt+1
N
dXt
X
#
The following proposition provides the condition under which the steady state
is saddle path stable.
Proposition 14. The su¢ cient and necessary conditions for saddle path sta-
bility of the steady state are
(2  )
  
 (1  2 + (1  )) + (1  ) 2 (1  )
1=   (1  )
>  (1  2)  2 (1   ) :
and
1

( (1  )  1 +  ) 6= (1  )    

;
Proof.Equation (58) can be written in the following form"
dNt+2
N
dXt+1
X
#
= D
"
dNt+1
N
dXt
X
#
:
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where
D 
"
N
(1  )=(1 )
X 1
    1  
# 1 "   
1  + (1  )

1 + N
(1  )=(1 )
X

0
(1  )       1  
#
=
1
d
2664
 
    + (1  ) (1  )

1 + N
(1  )=(1 )
X

+  (1  )   
!
   1
     ((1   ) = (1  )  )  N
(1  )=(1 )
X 
N(1  )=(1 )
X (1  )
3775(59)
where d = N
(1  )=(1 )
X (1  )      : det (D) and tr (D) are solved as
d2 det (D)
=
"
    + (1  ) (1  )

1 + N
(1  )=(1 )
X

+  (1  )   
#

N(1  )=(1 )
X
(1  )
  (1  )


   

((1   ) = (1  )  ) + N
(1  )=(1 )
X

(60)
d  tr (D)
=     + (1  ) (1  )

1 + 
N(1  )=(1 )
X

(61)
+  (1  )   

+ 
N(1  )=(1 )
X
(1  )
Let 1 and 2 denote the eigenvalues of the matrix D. Assume 1 > 2 without
loss of generality, and they are determined by
1 =
tr (D) +
q
tr (D)
2   4 det (D)
2
2 =
tr (D) 
q
tr (D)
2   4 det (D)
2
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for saddle-path stability is that j1j < 1
and j2j > 1 or j1j > 1 and j2j < 1: Since 1 > 2, this condition can be
divided into two groups: (i) 1 > 1 and  1 < 2 < 1 and (ii) 2 <  1 and
 1 < 1 < 1. Let us rst consider case (i) in the following. In this case we haveq
tr (D)
2   4 det (D) > 2  tr (D)
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and
tr (D)  2 <
q
tr (D)
2   4 det (D) < tr (D) + 2:
They can be reduced to
1  tr (D) <  det (D) < 1 + tr (D) ,
which is equivalent with
(1 D11) (1 D22) < D12D21 < (1 +D11) (1 +D22) :
Next let us consider case (ii) in which
 2  tr (D) <
q
tr (D)
2   4 det (D) < 2  tr (D)
and
tr (D) + 2 <
q
tr (D)
2   4 det (D):
They can be reduced to
tr (D) + 1 <  det (D) <  tr (D) + 1,
which is equivalent with
(1 +D11) (1 +D22) < D12D21 < (1 D11) (1 D22) :
Writing these two set of conditions using elements of D. In case (i),
(1 D11) (1 D22) < D12D21
is equivalent with
 (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
> 
   

, 1

( 1 +  +  (1  )) <    

(1  ) :
while
D12D21 < (1 +D11) (1 +D22)
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can be written as 
2 (2  )  (1  ) N(1  )=(1 )X
  (2  )    + 2 (1   ) +   2 (1  )
!
 (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
     


> 0
If  (1  ) N(1  )=(1 )X >     , which is equivalent with (1 D11) (1 D22) <
D12D21, then the above inequality holds if and only if
2 (2  )  (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
  (2  )   

> 2 (1  )  2 (1   ) :
At steady state, N
(1  )=(1 )
X =
 = 
1= (1 ) , the inequality above can be written
as
(2  )
  
 (1  2 + (1  )) + (1  ) 2 (1  )
1=   (1  ) >  (1  2)  2 (1   )
In case (ii),
D12D21 < (1 D11) (1 D22)
which is equivalent with
 (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
< 
   

, 1

( (1  )  1 +  ) > (1  )    

while
(1 +D11) (1 +D22) < D12D21
can be written as"
2 (2  )  (1  ) N(1  )=(1 )X
  (2  )    + 2 (1   ) +   2 (1  )
# 
 (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
     


< 0
If  (1   ) N(1  )=(1 )X <     , which is equivalent withD12D21 < (1 D11) (1 D22),
then the above inequality holds if and only if
2 (2  )  (1  ) N
(1  )=(1 )
X
  (2  )   

> 2 (1  )  2 (1   ) :
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Substitute N
(1  )=(1 )
X with the value at steady state, the inequality in this
case becomes
1

( (1  )  1 +  ) > (1  )    

and
(2  )
  
 (1  2 + (1  )) + (1  ) 2 (1  )
1=   (1  )
>  (1  2)  2 (1   ) :
The conditions in two cases together consist of the su¢ cient and necessary
condition for saddle path stability, which is summarized as
(2  )
  
 (1  2 + (1  )) + (1  ) 2 (1  )
1=   (1  )(62)
>  (1  2)  2 (1   ) :
and
1

( (1  )  1 +  ) 6= (1  )    

Given  <  , the Barro-Beckers assumption for the concavity of the prob-
lem, this condition holds for most sets of parameters. The second condition
holds except for a wide range of parameters. In particular, a nice su¢ cient
condition guarantees saddle path stability is  < 12 and  (1  2)  2 (1   ) :
We summarize it in the following Corollary.
Corollary 15. A su¢ cient condition for saddle path stability of the steady
state are  < 12 and  (1  2) < 2 (1   ) :
Under this condition, the left hand side of (62) is positive while its right
hand side is nonpositive.
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